9:52 PM :: Stephen (contact)

Thoughts while studying for exams: What does the Due Process Clause actually mean? Let's see what the courts have to say.

Indeed, if the Due Process Clause is to mean anything, . . .

• " . . . it requires us to do more than [assume that the BIA relied on the IJ's untimeliness finding and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction]." Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2004).
  
  
• " . . . it means that the courts must defend the 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 464 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
  
  
• " . . . I think we must assume that Maloney's corruption pervaded his work as a judge." Bracy v. Gramley, 81 F.3d 684, 700 (7th Cir. 1996).
  
  
• " . . . it should mean that a person who holds the latest controlling court opinion declaring his activities constitutionally protected should be able to depend on that ruling to protect like activities from criminal conviction until that opinion is reversed, or at least until the Supreme Court has granted certiorari." United States v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1987).
  
  
• " . . . it means that a hearing must be something more than a 'formal ritual.'" Graham v. Baughman, 772 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1985).
  
  
• " . . . it means a trial before an unbiased judge and jury." Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238, 1249 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arnold, J., concurring).
  
  
• " . . . it is a fundamental guarantee that stakeholders are provided both sufficient notice and fair procedures when governmental discretion mandates the abrogation of their rights or privileges." Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 339 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2004).
  
  
• " . . . [it] signifies a right to be heard in one's defense." Foley v. Foley, 52 P. 122, 124 (Cal. 1898).
  
  
• " . . . it provides constitutional protection of the right to participate meaningfully in critical proceedings." Franklin v. District of Columbia, 960 F. Supp. 394, 432 (D.D.C. 1997).
  
  
• " . . . [the California Youth Authority] cannot deliberately structure procedures which prevent counsel retained at a ward's expense from reviewing the ward's file and consulting with the ward before such a hearing." In re Michael I., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 654 (Ct. App. 1998).
  
  
• " . . . it must mean substantially more than was afforded appellant here." People v. Jacia, 144 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (App. Ct. 1978).
  
  
• " . . . it means that a woman cannot be imprisoned for two and one-quarter years under a law that was declared invalid ab initio by this Court." State v. Lemon, 825 So. 2d 927, 933 (Fla. 2002).
  
  
• " . . . it means Walker should not be required to run that gauntlet [of risking a 30-day jail sentence for each day of non-conformance with the board's order while the question whether he is maintaining a nuisance is litigated in a criminal action]." Walker v. Johnson County, 209 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa 1973).
  
  
• " . . . it should mean equality in the determination of the rights of those affected." Crowe v. De Gioia, 430 A.2d 251, 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (quoting Hague v. Warren, 59 A.2d 440 (N.J. Errors & App. 1948), rev'd, 447 A.3d 173 (N.J. 1982).
  
  
• " . . . it means that a litigant must be given an opportunity to meet an issue before an adverse determination is made." Lowndes Products, Inc. v. Brower, 191 S.E.2d 761, 338 (S.C 1972).
  
  
• " . . . it means that a defendant is entitled to some character of notice before his rights may be effected by suits, actions or proceedings in courts of the land, and that notice to the person or official who as plaintiff initiates the suit is, in all reason, no notice whatever." Baird-Gatzmer Corp. v. Henry Clay Coal Mining Co., 50 S.E.2d 673, 678 (W. Va. 1948).